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This paper examines the potential effect of marital disruption on intergenerational earnings mobility. 
We observe the earnings of children born in 1960 and 1970 along with their biological fathers and 
mothers. The earnings mobility between sons and daughters relative to the earnings of their mothers 
and fathers is estimated. Our results suggest that divorce is associated with increased mobility, except 
between mothers‘ and daughters‘ earnings. Transition matrices reveal that the direction of the mobility 
is negative; children of divorced parents tend to move downward in the earnings distribution compared 
to children from intact families. Finally, we utilize information on the earnings mobility of siblings in 
dissolved families who grew up when the family was intact. The difference between pre- and post-
divorce siblings is in turn compared with sibling differences in intact families.   
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The body of research on intergenerational correlations of social and economic status has been 
growing during recent decades.
1 One finding from this research is that the Scandinavian 
countries are characterized by high intergenerational earnings mobility relative to the US and 
the UK (Björklund and Jäntti, 1997; Bratberg et al., 2005, 2007; Bratsberg et al., 2007). It has 
been suggested that high mobility in the Scandinavian societies is the result of policies aimed 
at reducing inequality. The Norwegian welfare state is characterised by a high degree of 
redistribution, low wage dispersion, and an educational system focused on providing equal 
opportunities.  
 Norway is also included among the countries in Europe with the highest numbers of 
marital dissolutions. In 1960, the probability that a marriage would be dissolved within a 
period of twenty years was 7.7%, increasing to 20.5% in 1980 and fluctuating between 35% 
and 40% from 1990 (Statistics Norway, 2011a).  These changes have been followed by 
transitions from intact two-parent families to alternative family structures like single 
parenthood and step-parent families. In 2010, only 75 % of children between 0 and 17 years 
of age lived with both biological parents, as compared to 82 % in 1989 (Statistics Norway, 
2011b). A large body of literature—within economics and other fields—deals with the impact 
of parental divorce on children, see e.g. Amato and Keith (1991), McLanahan and Sandefur 
(1994), and Gruber (2004). The main picture is that the children of divorced parents have less 
favourable outcomes regarding educational attainment, high school drop-out ratio, early 
motherhood, youth unemployment, etc.   
In the standard approach to modelling intergenerational earnings transmission, 
represented by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), parents‘ earnings are linked to their 
children‘s by families investing a part of their income in the younger generation‘s education. 
                                                 
1 See Solon (1999) for a review. 3 
 
The higher this correlation is, the less is intergenerational mobility.  Divorce may reduce the 
households‘ economic resources, and thus, the potential for investing in the children‘s human 
capital. If the custodial parent must increase his or her labour supply to offset the loss of a 
second income, it may have adverse effects on the cognitive and non-cognitive environment 
of the children (less time to assist the children in homework, after-school activities, etc.). This 
form of investment extends the Becker-Tomes type, but has gained increasing attention in 
recent studies of human capital accumulation, see e.g. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and 
Heckman and Masterov (2007). In divorced families, it may be crucial to separate father-child 
from mother-child earnings correlations. The typical outcome is that the mother is the 
custodial parent, and according to the human capital investment approach, this should 
increase the mother-child correlation but decrease the father-child correlation.
23 Time-use 
studies, e.g. Lundberg (2005), indicate that fathers in intact families spend more time with 
their sons than their daughters. If the marital break-up leads to less father-child contact with 
less opportunity to influence the child, it also points to smaller father-child correlations. On 
the other hand, if there is a strong biological component (‗nature‘) in intergenerational 
mobility, father-child correlations should be less affected by a non-resident father.  
There is a relatively small body of literature addressing divorce and intergenerational 
mobility. Peters (1992), using data from the US, finds no effect of a disrupted family on the 
mobility of sons or daughters. In another American study, Couch and Lillard (1997) find that 
sons of divorced couples are less mobile than others and attributes this result to a clustering of 
divorcing families, parents and children, in the lower part of the income distribution, i.e., 
there is less upward mobility. Björklund and Chadwick (2003) use Swedish data to address 
several constellations of biological and non-biological father-child pairs. They find that the 
                                                 
2 This is not an unambiguous prediction, however, as the new family structure may affect preferences for 
investing in children‘s human capital. 
3 In Norway, the parent with child custody receives most of the public transfers plus child support from the 
noncustodial parent, the latter being enforced by law. This probably makes the custodial parent better off than in 
most other countries. See Tjøtta and Vaage (2008) for details. 4 
 
association between the incomes of sons and biological fathers are weaker the less they lived 
together, and also that the correlation is weaker for non-biological than for biological fathers. 
Fertig (2007) uses PSID data and finds that with each additional year in a family involving a 
single or a step-parent, children‘s earnings move further from their biological fathers‘, but 
closer to their mothers‘. 
The main objective of the present paper is to add to this rather scarce literature using 
Norwegian administrative register data, which provides us with very long earnings series for 
the working-age population. We focus on the cohorts born in 1960 and 1970, comparing 
intergenerational earnings elasticities in divorced and intact families. In the literature on 
earnings transmission, a high degree of intergenerational mobility is closely related to 
equality of opportunity and is often considered a cornerstone of a well-functioning welfare 
state. The above discussion and literature review call for some reservations: if children of 
divorced parents typically move in a downward direction in the earnings distribution 
compared to their parents, it does not represent a welfare gain. Intergenerational elasticities 
from parent-child regressions only show the degree of mobility, not the direction. We 
therefore make a point of considering transition matrices, which also indicate the direction of 
mobility.  
A crucial question in empirical research on the impact of parental divorce on 
children‘s outcome is how to isolate the causal effects of divorce and separate them from 
other innate family characteristics. Families that break up might have characteristics (high 
conflict levels etc.) that would have had adverse effects on the children even in the counter-
factual case of no divorce. If divorcing families are selected on properties that affect child 
outcomes negatively, a negative effect of divorce on the estimated parent-child elasticity may 
be biased away from zero. We approach this issue by comparing the earnings of siblings in 
dissolved families who grew up before and after the divorce, respectively. This difference is 5 
 
in turn compared to corresponding sibling differences in intact families. The conclusion from 
this part of the analysis is that we cannot identify a divorce effect on intergenerational 
earnings elasticity.   
The paper is organised as follows. Estimation is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 
introduces the data material and discusses the design of the study. In Section 4, the results are 




We follow the standard approach used in the intergenerational earnings mobility literature and 











i y  is a measure of parental log lifetime earnings in family i, 
c
i y  is an according 
measure for the child, i is a random error term, and  is the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity. This parent-child regression may be motivated by parents investing a part of their 
income in their children‘s education, see Becker and Thomes (1979, 1986), Solon (1999) for 
formal models. Following Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), much attention in empirical 
work has been directed at measurement error bias following from using single-year 
observations as proxies for lifetime earnings. The resulting attenuation bias may be reduced 
by using instrumental variables or earnings averages over several years. This paper follows 
the latter approach. 
  An alternative – or supplement – to running parent-child regressions is to report 
quantile transition matrices. The earnings distributions of parents and children are divided 
into a number of percentiles, and then transition matrices are computed for the fraction of 6 
 
children that belongs to percentile k, given that the parent belongs to percentile j for all (j, k) 
pairs. In this paper, we report quartile transitions. 
  As our purpose is to explore the potential effect of parental divorce on 
intergenerational earnings elasticity, we run separate regressions for children from divorced 
and intact families. We also report transition matrices for the same groups. In most of the 
intergenerational earnings literature, what is termed 'parental income' is represented either by 
family earnings or father‘s earnings. Because we consider divorced families, we report 
regressions and transition matrices for mothers and fathers separately. 
  As noted in the introduction, comparing the intergenerational earnings elasticities of 
divorced and intact families is problematic if unobserved factors that affect the probability of 
divorce also affect parental earnings. To alleviate this problem, we have constructed a 
subsample of divorcing families where we can observe an older sibling who was not exposed 
to the divorce in adolescence and a younger sibling who was affected by the divorce in his or 
her youth. We have also constructed a comparison group with older and younger siblings in 
families that did not divorce. Let t denote older (t = 0) and younger (t = 1) siblings, and define 
two dummy variables as Di = 0 for intact families, Di = 1 for divorcing families, and Tt = 0 for 
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γ1, γ2, and γ3 allow the earnings level of the younger generation to differ between family types 
and between older and younger siblings. δ1, δ2, and δ3 allow the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity to vary accordingly
4 (the interactions of yit with Ti can be identified because parental 
earnings are observed separately for older and younger siblings). The test for a divorce effect 
is δ3 ≠ 0. 
                                                 
4 There is some evidence that intergenerational earnings elasticity changes over time, cf. Bratberg et al. (2005). 7 
 
  Consistency of OLS estimation of (2) relies on independence of the error term and 
divorce status, i.e.  0 ) | (  i it D E  . If divorce is endogenous to unobserved family 
characteristics, this approach produces inconsistent estimates. However, if unobserved family 
characteristics are constant over time, i.e. if  i it it f u    , where fi denotes the family effect, 
fixed effect estimation of (2) yields consistent results. For this approach to work, there must 
be sufficient within-family earnings variation to identify the elasticities.  
In the results section, we report OLS and fixed effects estimates of equation (2). First, 
we explain in more detail how the samples for the different estimations were identified.  
 
 
3. Data and sample 
The data used in this study is extracted from Norwegian administrative registers recorded by 
Statistics Norway. In the database, family and individual characteristics are available from 
censuses in 1960, 1970 and 1980, and from administrative data from 1990. Information on 
yearly earnings is available from 1967 to 2008 in separate series. 
Our sample consists of 62,071 married couples with children born in either 1960 or 
1970. The families are divided into intact and divorced families when the children are 10 and 
20 years of age, as the registers only contain data on family characteristics between 1960 and 
1980 in ten-year intervals. Table 1 shows the number of intact and divorced families during 
the children‘s adolescence. 
We follow Bratberg et al. (2005, 2007) and apply earnings from five subsequent years 
as a proxy for lifetime earnings.
5 
6 The earnings of children are measured at ages 32 to 36. For 
                                                 
5 The earnings series were originally collected for the purpose of calculating old-age pension. They include 
earnings but exclude interest, capital income, etc. Unemployment benefits, disability benefits, and sick pay are 
included. The fraction of ‗true‘ zero earners in our data is very low. Zero recorded earnings in most cases are due 
to registration errors. 
6 If earnings are missing or equal zero in one, two or three years, we use the average of the non-zero 
observations.
 If four or five years are missing or equal zero, the person is excluded from the study. 8 
 
parents, the earnings are measured between ages 39 and 65,
7 with an average age of about 50 
for the main part of our analysis.
8 Descriptive statistics on (log) earnings and age averages are 
presented in Table 2.  
Table 3 compares earnings distributions for divorced and intact families by placing 
them in quartiles for the full sample. The fractions of parents and children in intact families in 
the four categories mostly coincide with the full earnings distribution. In divorced families, 
fathers and sons are over-represented in the lower quartile and under-represented in the upper 
quartile. Divorced mothers are strongly under-represented in the lower and over-represented 
in the upper quartile, indicating that post-divorce, mothers typically become breadwinners. 
In the sample, we have identified 8,994 divorced and intact families that are used to 
investigate potential selection effects. These families consist of couples with at least two 
children, where the younger sibling is part of our main sample of children born in 1960 or 
1970.
9 Ideally, we would like to observe families where the older siblings in both family 
groups grew up when the families were intact, while for the younger siblings, the family was 
still intact for one group and divorced for the other; see section 2 for formal details. In 
practice, this is more complicated. Because we would like to measure the parents‘ earnings 
prior to the potential divorce, data limitations restrict the analysis to families where the 
divorce occurs when younger siblings are between 10 and 20 years of age.
10 To reduce the 
influence of a potential divorce on the older siblings, we demand the age difference between 
the younger and older siblings to be at least five years. Finally, to avoid potential cross-gender 
noise, we only observe families where the children are of the same sex.  Descriptive statistics 
for the siblings subsample are presented in Table 4.  
                                                 
7 The upper age limit is 65 because a significant portion of the total labour force has the opportunity to retire 
before the official retirement age at 67. 
8 The age intervals of parents are chosen to make the earnings averages comparable for intact and divorced 
families. 
9 In families with more than two children, we use siblings that are closest in age, given the earlier mentioned 
restrictions. 
10 The earnings records do not start before 1967, so we are not able to explore families who got divorced during 
the children‘s first 10 years. 9 
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The analysis is carried out as follows. First, the sons‘ and daughters‘ earnings are regressed 
on the fathers‘ and mothers‘ earnings, separately for intact and divorced families. Second, 
transition matrices are computed for the same groups. Finally, we explore the possible 
influence from unobserved family characteristics in the subsample of siblings. 
 
4.1 Intergenerational elasticities 
Estimated elasticities from OLS regressions of all parent-child pairs are reported in Table 5. 
Columns 1 and 2 show results for families that stayed intact during the first 10 and 20 years of 
the younger generation‘s lives, respectively, while columns 3 and 4 display estimates for 
families that broke up during the first 10 years or between 10 and 20. Column 5 shows joint 
estimates for all divorced families. 
Starting with the son-father mobility in intact families, we find an intergenerational 
elasticity of about 0.15; slightly lower for the daughter-father mobility. This is clearly in 
accordance with earlier estimates for Norway, based on approximately the same measure of 
permanent income and approximately the same average age of fathers and offspring, see 
Bratberg et al. (2005), Jäntti et al. (2006). It confirms the relatively high degree of mobility 
for Norway (and the Nordic countries) compared, for example, to the US and the UK, cf. 
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Solon (2002).  
The mobility between mothers and their offspring in intact families appears to be 
significantly higher, i.e. the elasticity is lower, than in the child-father case. This finding is 
consistent with fathers typically being breadwinners in intact families.      
Turning to divorced families, there are two relatively clear tendencies. The mobility is 
higher, i.e. the elasticity is lower, between parents and children in divorced relative to intact 
families, the only exception being the daughter-mother mobility. Moreover, this pattern is 10 
 
particularly strong for the families where the children were less than 10 years of age at the 
time of family dissolution (column 3), once again with the exception of daughter-mother 
mobility. This calls for several comments. 
First, how are we to interpret the high parent-child mobility? As noted above, much of 
the empirical literature on intergenerational earnings correlation assumes, at least indirectly, 
that high earnings mobility is a good thing for society because it implies equal opportunities 
and the possibility of the younger generations becoming successful, no matter their parental 
background.  The high intergenerational mobility in dissolved families, on the other hand, 
might indicate adverse effects on the children. Divorce leads to a drop in family resources and 
fewer opportunities for investing in the children‘s human capital. In that case, we may 
observe mobility down the earnings distribution. This conjecture is examined below using 
transition matrices.  
Second, the finding that divorce in the early youth (first 10 years) affects the mobility 
much more powerfully than in later years (10-20 years) is consistent with recent research on 
closely related areas. For example, Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Carneiro and Heckman 
(2002, 2003), focus on the long-term relationship between family income and skill formation. 
Allowing the family resources in early childhood and throughout the adolescence years to 
play a role, they find that lack of resources in early years fosters poor cognitive and non-
cognitive environment, low ability, and low expectations, leading to reduced college readiness 
for the children from the poorest quantiles. Such constraints are far more decisive for 
educational attainment than lack of family resources in late adolescence. 
Third, there are significant gender differences in the child-parent earnings correlation. 
The strongest drop in correlation is between sons and fathers when divorce happens in early 
youth (intergenerational elasticity falls from 0.15 to 0.04). The equivalent daughter-father 
change is quite close: from 0.14 to 0.05. For the child-mother correlation, on the other hand, 11 
 
the differences between intact and divorced families are more or less negligible. If divorced 
mothers are breadwinners, we would expect the elasticity to increase in divorced families, but 
we only observe this result for the daughter-mother elasticity when divorce comes before the 
age of 10, and to a small extent. The corresponding son-mother elasticity is insignificant. 
Previous research indicates that the father in general is the more important role model for his 
son(s) and the mother for her daughter(s) (McLanahan (1985). The most common outcome of 
divorce by far is that the mother gets daily custody for the children. This might affect the 
children differently if, in those cases, the boys are subject to weaker bonds with their (absent) 
fathers, while the daughters grow stronger bonds with their (present) mothers. Our results are 
inconclusive in this respect, as the difference between daughter-mother and son-mother 
elasticities are rather similar regardless of divorce status.  
Finally, note that all the results in Table 5 are based on permanent earnings calculated 
relatively late in the parents‘ lives (around 50 years of age on average). Recent research – see 
Haider and Solon (2006) for the US, Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) for Sweden, and Nilsen 
et al. (2011) for Norway – has revealed a strong, negative age dependency. Nilsen et al. 
compare mobility estimates between fathers when earnings are measured around 40 and 
around 50, respectively. They find the elasticity to be about 70 % higher when the earnings 
are based on the former group, arguing that the far smaller elasticity for the latter group is due 
to a substantial age and/or life cycle bias. Still, this bias need not be a problem when we 
compare intact and divorced families as long as it affects both groups equivalently.
11 
 
4.2 Transition matrices 
The transition matrices displayed in tables 6 to 9 shows the same tendency to persistence in 
the upper and lower parts of the earnings distribution that was reported in Bratberg et al. 
                                                 
11 It does, however, matter when we compare groups where the average age of the parents differ, as will be the 
case in the analysis of the sibling sample later in this section. 12 
 
(2005), whose results for the 1960 cohort are quite similar to the results for intact families in 
the present sample. However, we also find that in divorced families, the children tend to end 
up lower in the earnings distribution relative to their parents‘ position than children in intact 
families. This tendency to increased downward mobility is present for all upper (2
nd – 4
th) 
quartiles and, in many cases, is quite substantial. The result is similar to those of Couch and 
Lillard (1997), who only report father-son transitions, but their results are more dominated by 
persistence in the lower quartile.  
We have also computed transition matrices (not reported) that split divorced families 
according to child age at divorce. It appears that the time of divorce has an impact on the 
downward movement in the earnings distribution. For all mobility pairs except the son-father 
mobility, the downward movement is stronger when the parents separate when the offspring 
are below 10 years of age rather than between ages 10 and 20.
12 This observation coincides 
with the regression estimates for offspring and fathers, and suggests that the earlier the 
disruption takes place, the more disadvantaged the children are. 
 
4.3 Sibling results 
We now consider the siblings subsample. Due to the restriction that the included families 
should have at least two children, with age differences large enough for the older to not have 
been affected by divorce in adolescence while the younger is affected, we end up with rather 
few divorced families (365, with 8,629 families in the comparison group). We therefore pool 
children of both gender, and report only father-child elasticities.  
In Table 10, we report OLS results for each of the four groups (divorced vs. intact, 
younger vs. older). The first thing to note is that older and younger siblings appear to have 
quite different intergenerational elasticities, even in the intact families. Recall, however, that 
                                                 
12 These tables are available upon request.   13 
 
the fathers are, on average, 10 years younger when we calculate the permanent earnings for 
the older siblings (40 years of age, vs. 50 years in the case of younger siblings).  As in Haider 
and Solon (2006), Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006), and Nilsen et al. (2011), we expect an age 
bias to be present in cases of older fathers/younger siblings. Interestingly, the estimated 
elasticity for older siblings in intact families is about 65% higher than the younger ones, 
which is practically the same as the comparable fraction
13 in Nilsen et al. (70%).  This lends 
support to the interpretation that the estimated earnings mobility in intact families is stable 
across siblings, which is the opposite of the impression from the first glance at Table 10.  
The next question is whether the older siblings in families that later became dissolved 
have intergenerational elasticities that are comparable to their control group: the older siblings 
in intact families (0.21). Our point estimates for the former group is 0.19 but, as one might 
expect with the small sample at hand, with relatively large standard deviation (0.08). Hence, 
at the 5% level, we are not able to reject the hypothesis that the elasticities for older siblings 
in the two family types are identical.  
Turning the attention to the younger siblings in dissolved families, we find an 
elasticity of 0.07, which clearly is smaller than the estimates for their siblings growing up 
while the family was intact. Even if we add the alleged age bias of the size referred to earlier, 
the estimates of younger and older siblings are quite far from being equal. Once again, the 
small sample calls for caution in the interpretations; the large standard errors do not support 
statistically significant differences at conventional levels – not between younger and older 
siblings in dissolved families, and not between younger siblings in dissolved vs. intact 
families.  
                                                 
13 Our estimates are comparable to the ones in Nilsen et al. (2011) in terms of common data sources, 
approximately same average age for parents and offspring, and same size of earnings window (5 years) as a basis 
for the calculation of permanent earnings. The samples are different, however, in that Nilsen et al. do not 
condition on family type, and we do not condition on gender (in Table 10). 14 
 
Table 11 shows OLS and fixed effect results for the joint regression expressed in 
equation (2). The results from the OLS regression in the left panel confirm what we saw in 
Table 10. First, the difference between older siblings in divorced vs. intact families is not 
statistically significant. Second, there is a significant difference between older and younger 
siblings. Third, the extra difference in divorced families, 3 (the ‗divorce effect‘), is negative 
but insignificant. The results from the fixed effect in the right panel of Table 11 are all 
insignificant. This may be because there are only two observations in each family, and there is 
not enough within-family variation to identify the coefficients. 
Summing up the sibling results, they are inconclusive. On the one hand, the apparently 
large differences we found in Table 4 between children who grew up in divorcing families 
and children who did not, are not confirmed – we do find a difference but it is insignificant. 
On the other hand, we cannot conclude that the full sample results are due to unobserved 
family characteristics, as the fixed effect results do not identify the intact-family elasticities. 
This may be attributed to sample size and to little variation within families. Moreover, the 
large divorce effect in Table 4 was found for children who were exposed to divorce before the 
age of 10. For obvious reasons, we could not apply that age restriction when we constructed 
the siblings sample. Even without that restriction, the siblings sample is a selected group in 
the sense that each family have children with quite large age differences, a fact that may have 
affected the results.   
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this study was to explore differences in the intergenerational earnings mobility 
between intact and divorcing families, using full population data on the Norwegian cohorts 
born in 1960 and 1970. At ages 10 and 20, their families were classified as intact or divorced, 15 
 
and intergenerational earnings elasticities and quartile transition matrices were estimated for 
the according groups. 
As in previous Norwegian studies, the intergenerational earnings mobility in general 
was found to be high compared with the US, i.e., the estimated elasticities were relatively 
low. We also found higher elasticities between fathers and children than between mothers and 
children in intact families. For divorced families, the father-child elasticities were clearly 
lower, in particular when divorce took place during the first 10 years of the child‘s life. For 
the mother-child elasticities, however, no noticeable differences were found. This finding 
suggests that in divorced families, where mothers in most cases have custody of the children, 
the mother‘s economic resources are still important for the offspring‘s outcomes. While 
intergenerational earnings regressions do not allow us to separate the importance of economic 
resources from 'nurture' effects, i.e. the cognitive and non-cognitive environment while 
growing up, the reduced importance of an absent father‘s earnings may be interpreted as 
evidence against a strong biological (‗nature‘) component in this mobility measure. The fact 
that we find the largest intact-divorced differences for children who experienced a family split 
at a young age, is consistent with recent research, e.g. Carneiro and Heckman (2003), which 
highlights the importance of the early years in children‘s cognitive development. 
Our full sample analysis was augmented by estimates from a subsample of sibling 
pairs from divorcing families where the oldest did not experience the divorce during 
childhood, and a comparable sample of siblings from intact families. Data limitations (marital 
status only observed in 10-year intervals) and the general problem of finding families with 
sufficient spacing of childbirths left us with a very small sample of divorced families. OLS 
estimates were consistent with the main results, but the divorced-intact differences were 
insignificant. The fixed effect results that could have differenced out a potential family effect 
were largely insignificant, and we could not identify the intact-family elasticities. Thus, we 16 
 
cannot rule out that the observed differences between divorced and intact families may be due 
to ex ante unobserved heterogeneity. 
Quartile transition probabilities revealed that the increased mobility in divorced 
families is driven by a higher propensity for children in divorced families to move downwards 
in the income distribution, in particular as compared to their fathers. This finding agrees with 
Couch and Lillard‘s (1997) study from the US in the sense that children in divorced families 
tend to end up in the lower part of the distribution, but differs in the sense that in the US 
study, divorcing families, to a larger extent, are in the lower part at the outset. Accordingly, 
Couch and Lillard find that father-son earnings elasticities are higher in divorced families. An 
explanation for this discrepancy could be that in the US, credit constraints are more important 
for educational choices in poor families, hence the high elasticity. In Norway, education is 
free and the reduced father – child elasticity in divorced families may be a 'nurture' effect, 
which reflects the reduced influence of an absent father on the family‘s cognitive 
environment.  
We noted in the introduction that presently, one in four children will experience a 
parental break-up during childhood. The research presented in this paper is based on today‘s 
middle-aged, who grew up when divorce probabilities were lower. About 10% of the children 
in our sample experienced their parents divorcing before age 20. Our results may imply that, 
as the fraction of divorcing families increases, the traditional father-child earnings elasticity 
may decrease, not because of the reduced importance of economic resources, but as a result of 
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Table 1: Distribution of families during 
children's adolescence. 
      Birth  10 years old  20 years old 
Intact families  62.071  59.333  55.460 
         





Table 2: Descriptive statistics by family type  
  Intact families    Divorced families 
   Mean  SD  Min  Max    Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Sons                   
Earnings average  12.53  0.63  6.53  16.35    12.43  0.72  6.70  14.98 
Year of birth  1965.64  4.96  1960  1970    1967.19  4.49  1960  1970 
N  29,038    3,502 
                   
Daughters                   
Earnings average  11.99  0.81  4.03  15.05    11.96  0.83  7.42  14.07 
Year of birth  1965.67  4.96  1960  1970    1967.19  4.50  1960  1970 
N  26,870    3,160 
                   
Fathers                   
Earnings average  12.37  0.63  5.35  15.78    12.21  0.89  5.22  14.41 
Age average   49.92  0.95  48.00  57.00    50.16  3.37  40.00  63.00 
Year of birth  1935.58  8.11  1912  1953    1939.91  6.96  1912  1953 
N  55,460    6,611 
                   
Mothers                   
Earnings average  11.47  1.01  5.04  13.96    11.81  0.95  4.74  13.56 
Age average  48.01  0.20  48.00  55.00    47.87  2.84  39.00  63.00 
Year of birth  1938.82  7.29  1914  1954    1942.67  6.38  1916  1954 
N  55,460    6,611 
Notes: The earnings measure is the average of log earnings from five subsequent years. The family 




Table 3: Earnings distributions by family type       
  Intact  Divorced      Intact  Divorced 
   families  families        families  families 
Sons        Fathers     
Lower quartile  0.25  0.30    Lower quartile  0.24  0.31 
Lower middle quartile  0.25  0.25    Lower middle quartile  0.26  0.21 
Upper middle quartile  0.25  0.23    Upper middle quartile  0.25  0.23 
Upper quartile  0.25  0.22    Upper quartile  0.25  0.25 
N  29,038  3,502    N  55,908  6,662 
             
Daughters        Mothers     
Lower quartile  0.25  0.26    Lower quartile  0.26  0.14 
Lower middle quartile  0.25  0.23    Lower middle quartile  0.26  0.15 
Upper middle quartile  0.25  0.25    Upper middle quartile  0.25  0.27 
Upper quartile  0.25  0.26    Upper quartile  0.23  0.44 
N  26,870  3,160     N  55,908  6,662 
Note: Marital status is observed when the children are 20 years of age. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the siblings subsample. 
  Intact families    Divorced families 
   Mean  SD  Min  Max     Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Younger siblings                   
Earnings 
average  12.27  0.75  6.50  15.14    12.23  0.79  7.86  13.94 
Year of birth  1965.86  4.93  1960  1970    1966.63  4.73  1960  1970 
N  8,629    365 
                   
Older siblings                    
Earnings 
average  12.07  0.86  6.03  14.15    12.15  0.77  8.15  14.21 
Year of birth  1958.68  5.31  1941  1965    1959.97  4.94  1946  1965 
N  8,629    365 
                   
Fathers, pre-
divorce                   
Earnings 
average  12.18  0.41  8.25  13.16    12.36  0.49  7.54  13.34 
Age average  39.24  6.07  29.00  57.00    40.20  4.06  31.00  50.00 
Year of birth  1930.68  7.18  1912  1949    1934.76  6.37  1919  1947 
N  8,629    365 
                   
Fathers, post-
divorce                   
Earnings 
average  12.28  0.62  6.78  14.23    12.13  0.92  7.38  13.71 
Age average  50.43  1.01  48.00  57.00    53.88  3.97  44.00  63.00 
Year of birth  1930.68  7.21  1912  1949    1934.76  6.37  1919  1947 
N  8,629    365 
Notes: The earnings measure is the average of log earnings from five subsequent years. The divorced families 
are couples that got divorced when the younger siblings where between 10 and 20 years. The intact families are 
couples that where not divorced during the same time period. Age average for sons and daughters is 34.  22 
 
 
Table 5: Intergenerational earnings elasticities for the full 
sample. OLS              
 
Intact during first 10 
years of child's life 
Intact during first 20 
years of child's life   
Divorced during first 
10 years of child's life 
Divorced between first 10 
and 20 years of child's life 
All divorced 
families 
Son-father mobility             
β  0.148***  0.149***    0.039**  0.122***  0.080*** 
sd(β)  (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
N  31,058  29,038    1,482  2,020  3,502 
             
Son-mother mobility             
β  0.059***  0.068***    0.027  0.056***  0.043*** 
sd(β)  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.013) 
N  31,058  29,038    1,482  2,020  3,502 
             
Daughter-father mobility             
β  0.139***  0.145***    0.053**  0.087***  0.071*** 
sd(β)  (0.007)  (0.008)    (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.017) 
N  28,752  26,870    1,278  1,882  3,160 
             
Daughter-mother mobility             
β  0.099***  0.105***    0.115***  0.098***  0.105*** 
sd(β)  (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.016) 
N  28,752  26,870    1,278  1,882  3,160 




Table 6: Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities between 
fathers and sons. 
     Sons 
    Lower  Lower middle  Upper middle  Upper  N 
      quartile  quartile  quartile  quartile   
Married fathers                    
Lower quartile    0.34  0.28  0.22  0.16  7,073 
Lower middle quartile    0.26  0.29  0.25  0.19  7,262 
Upper middle quartile    0.22  0.24  0.28  0.26  7,349 
Upper quartile    0.16  0.18  0.25  0.40  7,354 
N    7,073  7,262  7,349  7,354  29,038 
             
Divorced fathers             
Lower quartile    0.37  0.26  0.21  0.16  1,062 
Lower middle quartile    0.30  0.29  0.24  0.17  874 
Upper middle quartile    0.26  0.25  0.25  0.24  785 
Upper quartile    0.26  0.20  0.21  0.33  781 
N     1,062  874  785  781  3,502 
Notes: Family structure observed when the children are 20 years old. The quartiles refer to the  
position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her cohort. The  
person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years.  
 
 
Table 7: Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities between 
mothers and sons. 
     Sons 
    Lower  Lower middle  Upper middle  Upper  N 
      quartile  quartile  quartile  quartile   
Married mothers                   
Lower quartile    0.30  0.28  0.24  0.19  7,073 
Lower middle quartile    0.26  0.26  0.25  0.23  7,262 
Upper middle quartile    0.23  0.25  0.25  0.27  7,349 
Upper quartile    0.17  0.21  0.27  0.35  7,354 
N    7,073  7,262  7,349  7,354  29,038 
             
Divorced mothers             
Lower quartile    0.36  0.27  0.19  0.19  1,062 
Lower middle quartile    0.33  0.29  0.20  0.18  874 
Upper middle quartile    0.33  0.25  0.23  0.19  785 
Upper quartile    0.26  0.23  0.24  0.27  781 
N     1,062  874  785  781  3,502 
Notes: Family structure observed when the children are 20 years old. The quartiles refer to the  
position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her cohort. The  






Table 8: Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities between 
fathers and daughters. 
     Daughters 
    Lower  Lower middle  Upper middle  Upper  N 
      quartile  quartile  quartile  quartile   
Married fathers                    
Lower quartile    0.31  0.28  0.24  0.17  6,675 
Lower middle quartile    0.27  0.27  0.26  0.19  6,776 
Upper middle quartile    0.23  0.25  0.26  0.26  6,724 
Upper quartile    0.18  0.20  0.24  0.38  6,695 
N    6,675  6,776  6,724  6,695  26,870 
             
Divorced fathers             
Lower quartile    0.31  0.25  0.25  0.19  833 
Lower middle quartile    0.29  0.25  0.26  0.20  731 
Upper middle quartile    0.25  0.23  0.26  0.26  784 
Upper quartile    0.21  0.19  0.22  0.38  812 
N     833  731  784  812  3,160 
Notes: Family structure observed when the children are 20 years old. The quartiles refer to the  
position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her cohort. The  
person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years.  
 
 
Table 9: Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities between 
mothers and daughters. 
     Daughters 
    Lower  Lower middle  Upper middle  Upper  N 
      quartile  quartile  quartile  quartile   
Married mothers                   
Lower quartile    0.33  0.28  0.23  0.17  6,675 
Lower middle quartile    0.28  0.27  0.25  0.21  6,776 
Upper middle quartile    0.22  0.25  0.27  0.26  6,724 
Upper quartile    0.16  0.21  0.26  0.38  6,695 
N    6,675  6,776  6,724  6,695  26,870 
             
Divorced mothers             
Lower quartile    0.36  0.23  0.22  0.19  833 
Lower middle quartile    0.36  0.22  0.21  0.21  731 
Upper middle quartile    0.26  0.27  0.26  0.20  784 
Upper quartile    0.20  0.21  0.26  0.33  812 
N     833  731  784  812  3,160 
Notes: Family structure observed when the children are 20 years old. The quartiles refer to the  
position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her cohort. The  








Table 10: Siblings sample. OLS results from separate 
regressions 
Children-father mobility  Intact  Divorced 
   Families  families 
Younger siblings  0.131***  0.073* 
  (0.015)  (0.038) 
N  8,629  365 
     
Older siblings  0.214***  0.185** 
  (0.025)  (0.080) 
N  8,629  365 




Table 11: Siblings sample. Pooled OLS and family fixed 
effects    
Children-father mobility  OLS  FE 
   Coeff.  St. Dev.  Coeff.  St. Dev. 
         
Older siblings in intact families  0.214***  0.025  0.034  0.032 
Older siblings in divorced families  -0.030  0.084  -0.052  0.126 
Younger siblings in intact families  -0.083***  0.029  -0.042  0.027 
Younger siblings in divorced families  -0.03  0.09  0.020  0.103 
N  17.988     8,184    
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